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Article 9

THE CONSERVATISM OF JUSTICE HARLAN*
CHARLES FRIED**

What I shall try to do in this paper is excavate and display for you my
own complex, confused, and in part long-buried impressions of and
reactions to the great Justice so many of us writing here were privileged
to know and some of us to serve.
It is remarkable how the Justice's name has been invoked in the recent
period of confirmation controversies-a period I would describe as the
definitive passing of the Warren-Brennan Court majority. In such a time
of agonized and controversial transition, all sides seemed to concur that
Justice Harlan was the model that they could and their antagonists would
have to accept. Governor Dukakis, for instance, did just that during his
1988 presidential campaign.' Justice Harlan's name was invoked again in
the fall of 1990 when Justice Souter, during his uncommonly soothing and
reassuring confirmation hearings, gave the Justice as a model, perhaps his
principal model.2 In the latter instance I would guess this was accurate.
In the former I am less sure.
I am certain that neither of these men looked to the Justice because
they would embrace all of the conclusions he came to during his sixteen
years on the Court. Amongst the Justice's prolific output of opinions are
dissents in which he came to results that many would find unacceptable
today. For example, in Justice Harlan's America, states and municipal
governments would be free of constitutional inhibitions to apportion
electoral districts as they chose, so long, I suppose, as they did not do so
with an intent to disadvantage racial minorities.' The exclusionary rule
would not be constitutionally compelled in state criminal proceedings,4
nor would the restrictions on confessions imposed by the Miranda rule.5
* Presented at the -New York Law School Centennial Conference in Honor of Justice

John Marshall Harlan (Apr. 20, 1991).
**

Carter Professor of General Jurisprudence, Harvard Law School.

1. See David A. Kaplan, Will the Court Be an Issue?, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 29, 1988, at
24.
2. See For David Souter with Hope, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 27, 1990, at A22.
3. See, e.g., Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 486 (1968) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting); Rockefeller v. Wells, 389 U.S. 421, 421 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting);
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 589 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Wesberry v. Sanders,
376 U.S. 1, 20 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 382 (1963)
(Harlan, I., dissenting); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 330 (1962) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
4. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 672 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
5. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 504 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see
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States would not be bound by the privilege against self-incrimination as it
is recognized in federal courts.6 State poll taxes would be constitutional, 7
as would state residency requirements for welfare and other benefits.8
Finally, and most startlingly, local authorities would be free to make
criminal the sale of D.H. Lawrence's Lady Chatterley's Lover.9 Indeed,
it is difficult even to imagine what our legal landscape would be like today
had the Justice's dissents all set what the law is to be.
Ironically, though, the Justice's analytical style seems discordant with
judicial philosophies embraced by many members of the conservative
camp in recent years. For example, the Justice was a strong believer in
balancing as opposed to fixed and firm rules. 10 He believed that the
content of constitutional provisions changed and moved with the times"
also Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 642 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing
that defendant's spontaneous confession should not have been suppressed).
6. See Griffin v. California, 38 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
7. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 680 (1966) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
8. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 651 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
9. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 496 (1957) (Harlan, J.,concurring in part
and dissenting in part); see also Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 493 (1966)
(Harlan, J.,dissenting) (stating that the federal government should be allowed to ban only
"hard-core" pornography from the mails); A Book Named "John Cleveland's Memoirs of
a Woman of Pleasure" v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 455 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(supporting a state's right to rule that Fanny Hill is obscene and not entitled to protection
under the First Amendment); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 203 (1964) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (asserting that a state should be free to ban material that it reasonably believes
treats sex in a fundamentally offensive manner).
10. See, for example, Monrome v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 192 (1960) (Harlan, J.,
concurring), where Justice Harlan rejected conclusions based on findings purportedly of
clear legislative intent reached by both Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, id. at 171,
and Justice Frankfurter, writing in dissent, id. at 237 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Justice
Harlan engaged in a comprehensive examination of the congressional records and concluded
that "itihose aspects of Congress' purpose ...seem to me to be inherently ambiguous
when applied to the case of an isolated abuse of state authority by an official." Id. at 193
(Harlan, J., concurring).
11. See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 67-68 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(rejecting Justice Black's assertion that Congress's Article I power to regulate the Armed
Forces was intended to be unmodified by the Necessary and Proper Clause, in part because
such a finding would require that "this power is incapable of expansion under changing
circumstances"); see also In reWinship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(stating that the requirements of the Due Process Clause should be extended to include
proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a juvenile delinquency proceeding); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 349 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring) (describing the evolution
of the right to appointed counsel from application in capital cases to cases with special
circumstances and finally to any serious criminal charge).
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and, most
notably, he was the author of the constitutional right to
12
privacy.
Perhaps each end of the spectrum in the political struggles for the
judiciary thought that they would have more to gain than to lose from the
appointment of another (I will not say second, because it would be the
third) Justice Harlan.13 But I doubt it. What journalists style the liberal
wing of the dispute would certainly be the loser, and they know it.
Nonetheless, I do not think we should dismiss this revealing, puzzling
phenomenon by the superficial observation that each side is just trying to
sound reasonable and open-minded, while in fact conceding nothing-since
no new John Harlan will come along to test the sincerity of their
protestations. No, I think there is a deeper insight and a less meretricious
motivation at work here. The Justice represented something many yearn
for in their judges-even when they know they may not like the
conclusions the judge will likely reach.
There were distinct virtues about the Justice, virtues many respond to.
Was one of these his conservatism? It is my assignment to capture a sense
of the Justice's conservatism, to identify those themes that underlie his
judicial philosophy.
The Justice certainly was conservative. One hallmark of this
conservatism was his skepticism about rapid change and seemingly quick
solutions. Put another way, he believed in the value of not upsetting
established ways of doing things. There are those who thrill at being
present at a radical moment. With the Justice there also was a strong
reaction to such moments, but with him it was distaste.14 His dissents in
12. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
13. The first Justice John Marshall Harlan, grandfather of the Justice who bore his
name and served from 1955 to 1971, was a member of the Supreme Court for almost
thirty-four years following his appointment in 1877 by President Rutherford B. Hayes.
Norman Dorsen, John Marshall Harlan, in 4 THE JUSTiCES OF THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT 1789-1969: THEIR LiVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 2803, 2803 (Leon
Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1969).
14. CfY EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 147-48
(J.G.A. Pocock ed., 1987) (1790):
It is this inability to wrestle with difficulty which has obliged the arbitraxy
Assembly of France to commence their schemes of reform with abolition and
total destruction. But is it in destroying and pulling down that skill is displayed?
. . . Rage and frenzy will pull down more in half an hour than prudence,
deliberation and foresight can build upon in a hundred years.
At once to preserve and reform is quite another thing.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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Levy v. Louisiana15 and Griffin v. Illinois,16 while based on grounds of
federalism and logic-and resting quite sufficiently on such grounds-are
nonetheless redolent of a distaste for legal adventurism.
In this respect, the contrast with the Justice who took his seat is
always instructive. Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court in National
League of Cities v. Usery17 was not only a remarkable and imaginative
stroke, it was a bold departure from the approach of the Court to issues
of congressional power in regard to interstate commerce. This departure
was all the more remarkable because it rested on an entirely novel
ground-not on the lack of Article I power, but on an inhibition on the
admitted use of that power, derived from the Tenth Amendment and
associated structural considerations.18 I have no doubt that had that grain
fallen on ground less stony it might have grown up into a sturdy and
durable doctrinal tree of some shape or other-the distinctions it proposed
were, after all, no less manageable than many with which the Supreme
Court and lower courts struggle as part of their regular common law
labors. Justice O'Connor's magisterial dissent in FERC v. Mississippi 9
amply illustrates this. What is striking in this context is that just eight
years before in Maryland v. Wirtz,' Justice Harlan, whose devotion to
federalism was second to none, had rejected the very argument that
2
prevailed in National League of Cities as untenableO-no
doubt as an
expression of his kind of conservatism.
But the picture is complex-perhaps because the very concept of
conservatism is complex. It is not some kind of nostalgic sentimentality.
The Justice was not particularly sentimental; he was too much a man of
the world for that. And conservatism is not the same as a radical
reactionary impulse to build an imagined utopia of the past-just as it
rejects utopias imagined for the future. It is this characteristic that
distinguishes Justice Harlan from some of the more radical judges who
appeared in what the journalists call the conservative revival of the Reagan
15. 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
16. 351 U.S. 12, 38 (1956) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
17. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
18. See id. at 842 ("Inhem are limits upon the power of Congress to override state
sovereignty, even when exercising its otherwise plenary powers ... conferred by Art. I
of the Constitution ....
[A]n express declaration of this limitation is found in the Tenth
Amendment .
").
19. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 775 (1982)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part) (criticizing the Court's
opinion as violative of the principles of National League of Cities).
20. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
21. See id. at 196-97.
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years.' What characterizes the conservative temperament is not a refusal
to accept any change, but rather a disposition to be skeptical about rapid

change, radical change, and particularly change that is driven by abstract

philosophical visions about how the world is to be transformed.
The Justice had this kind of skepticism in ample measure. For
instance, he had no vast projects for overruling great chunks of the law.

He came to the Court in 1955, in time for the second phase of Brown v.
Board of Educationz ' (a decision with which he had sympathy born of

more than familial piety for his eponymous ancestor whose dissenting
opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson' was its precursor). The course had

already been set some ten and twenty years before to impose significant
free speech

and free exercise

restraints on both federal and state

governments. In addition, the Court had decided the most stringent of the
Establishment Clause cases, again limiting both federal and state
governments.' These decisions were all relatively recent and quite
radical departures, but the Justice never showed the slightest inclination

to take the holdings as anything but valid premises for further reasoning.

22. See, e.g., Walter Goodman, Neoconservatives Assess PoliticalTrends and Foreign
Policy, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1984, at B9.
23. Brown v. Board of Edue. (II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955); see also Brown v. Board of
Educ. (I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
24. 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
25. See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 5 (1949) (holding unconstitutional an
ordinance which made any misbehavior violating public peace and decorum a breach of the
peace because it violated the First Amendment); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 149
(1943) (holding a municipal ordinance prohibiting distribution of circulars from door to
door void as a denial of freedom of speech and the press); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S.
252, 262 (1941) (holding that freedom of speech is protected against censorship unless it
is likely to produce a clear and present danger rising far above public inconvenience,
annoyance, or unrest); Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147, 165 (1939) (holding that
municipal ordinances prohibiting unlicensed solicitation and distribution of circulars were
an abridgement of freedom of speech).
26. See West Virginia State Bd. of Edue. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)
(finding that state action compelling the flag salute and pledge transcended constitutional
limitations and violated First and Fourteenth Amendments); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296, 305 (1940) (holding that a state statute forbidding solicitation of money or
valuables for religious cause without certification by the state violated freedom of religion).
27. See McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 209 (1948) (finding that a state's
use of its tax-supported public school system to enable sectarian groups to give religious
instruction to public school pupils violated the First Amendment); Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (holding that under the Establishment Clause neither a state
nor the federal government may pass laws aiding one religion, aiding all religions, or
preferring one religion over another).
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This willingness to accept a trajectory set in earlier cases, even a

trajectory with which he almost undoubtedly would not have agreed as an

original matter, is illustrated by his concurrence in Monroe v. Pape.2"
That case was the basis for a revolution in federal jurisdiction,' giving
federal district courts vast power to inquire into the propriety of local

conduct through a construction of section 19831 that was far from
inevitable. But instead of following Justice Frankfurter's strictures in
dissent,3 strictures which surely must have accorded with Justice
Harlan's own conception of the proper relation between federal courts and

state authorities, he concurred in the Court's opinion. He believed that the

way had been set some years before in Screws v. United States,3" even

though that case involved a criminal analogue to section 1983 and thus a
far less expansive context.

His revulsion at the misbehavior of individual, low-level officers may
perhaps have had something to do with his conclusion in Monroe, as it did
later in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics,33 where the Henry Hart/Felix Frankfurter view of federal

jurisdiction as exceptional and state law*remedies as the general rule
would have led to a different result. I think, however, that Justice
Harlan's willingness to follow a trajectory set in earlier decisions was
more fundamentally inspired by the way he viewed the world. The Justice
respected the precedents that had been handed down to him. Perhaps it

was because he knew from his years of experience as a distinguished
private practitioner' that people relied on precedents, structuring their

28. 365 U.S. 167, 192 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring).
29. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 375 (1989) (discussing the
"phenomenal" growth in § 1983 litigation since 1961, when Monroe was decided, to over
20,000 such suits in 1977 and more than 36,000 in 1985).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
31. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 202 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (arguing that cause of
action under § 1983 should be limited to official offenses authorized by state law).
32. 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
33. 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
34. The Justice spent the bulk of his career before coming to the bench as a trial
lawyer with Root, Clark, Buckner & Howland in New York. While at Root, Clark, Justice
Harlan first became acquainted with Emory Buckner, one of the nation's most respected
trial lawyers. The men became extremely close over the years, and Harlan served as a
Division Manager in the U.S. Attorney's Office in the Southern District of New York from
1925 to 1928 when Mr. Buckner was U.S. Attorney there. Following their joint return to
Root, Clark, Justice Harlan rose to become Buckner's most able trial partner, assuming
increasing responsibility from Buckner as the elder man's health began to fail in the 1930s
and 40s. See MARTIN MAYER, EMORY BUCKNER2 (1968); David L. Shapiro, Biographical
Note to THE EVOLUION OF A JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY: SELECTED OPINIONS AND PAPERS OF
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lives and their affairs around the decisions rendered by the courts.
Respect for precedent could not have been the Justice's only
motivation, however, because one does not interpret a constitutional
provision like the Free Exercise Clause solely or even primarily on the
basis of any reliance that people have placed on previous interpretations
of the Clause. I strongly suspect that there is something more, perhaps
something having to do with the place the Justice occupied as a member
of a family with a long tradition of distinguished statesmen.3 5 The
Justice's grandfather, of course, served on the Supreme Court for over
three decades, authoring his famous invective against the "separate but
equal" doctrine in his dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson. 6 The Justice's
great-grandfather was Attorney General of Kentucky, and a congressman
from that state.37 And the first member of the Harlan family to come to
America served as governor of Delaware in 1695, eight years after he
came to the United States.38
Justice Harlan therefore appreciated the efforts of the people who
helped to shape the legal edifice that he was called upon to interpret as a
member of the Supreme Court. He felt the need to address the decisions
of these individuals, to analyze their reasoning with respect, and either to
reconcile his decisions with their wisdom or at least to be wary of
departing in a wholesale manner from the judgments they had reached. In
this respect, I would identify one of the characteristics of the Justice's
conservatism as simple humility-an unwillingness to think he possessed
all of the insight into the resolution of a problem. To the Justice, there
was wisdom in the precedent to be consulted and drawn upon, and there
were limits beyond which the Court should not venture at all.39
This is not to say that Justice Harlan was unwilling to overturn a
precedent, even one of long standing. In Moragne v. State Marine

JUSTICE JoHN M. HARiAN xvii, xvii-xx (David L. Shapiro ed., 1969).
35. See Earl Warren, Justice Harlan,As Seen by a Colleague, 85 HARV. L. REV. 369,
369 (1971) ("For sixteen years, he served the Court with an almost religious fervor-as
though impelled by his family heritage to leave his imprint on the jurisprudence of the
Nation.").
36. 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, I., dissenting).
37. Shapiro, supra note 34, at xvii.
38. Id.
39. Cf. BURKE, supra note 14, at 148:
If circumspection and caution are a part of wisdom when we work only upon
inanimate matter, surely they become a part of duty, too, when the subject of our
demolition and construction is not bricks and timber but sentient beings, by the
sudden alteration of whose state, condition and habits multitudes may be
rendered miserable.
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Lines,' for instance, he wrote for the Court in overturning a maritime
decision it had rendered some eighty-four years earlier, remarking that
"[t]he history of the common-law rule indicates that it was based on a
particular set of factors that had, when [the previous decision in question]
was decided, long since been thrown into discard even in England, and
that had never existed in this country at all." 41 Typically, however,
when he undertook to upset a law or official action, it was with the sense
of a gentleman that this time things had gone too far. The Connecticut
birth control statute swept aside in Griswold v. Connecticut,4" for
example, was vulnerable as an anomaly, and thus, as his opinion in Poe
v. Ullman' indicated, distinguishable from other laws governing sexual.
morality. Bivens" and Monroe' were cases that involved lawsuits
against individual officers who had admittedly abused unquestioned
authority-they were not attempts to restructure the established way of
doing things. In this sense, Justice Harlan reminds me of the Justice whose
seat he took, although he lacked Justice Jackson's brio and superb prose
style.
It is worth contrasting Justice Harlan's attitude with that of those
scholars-and they were eminent, liberal, and full of good faith-who
expressed serious doubts about the doctrinal propriety of Brown v. Board
of Education," and who questioned whether the decision provided a valid
premise for further reasoning. It is also worth considering the speculations
of Justice Rehnquist, who succeeded to the Justice's seat, as he then
was-in his dissent in Wallace v. Jaffree47 over the legitimacy of the
precedents that applied the Establishment Clause to the states. Chief
Justice Rehnquist's historical and logical analysis seems to me quite
correct," but it proposes a thorough revolution in this area of the law that
Justice Harlan would not have contemplated. And consider too Justice
Scalia's proposals to get rid of the dormant Commerce Clause in cases
such as Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises." Federalist
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

398 U.S. 375 (1970).
Id. at 381.
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388

(1971).
45. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
46. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
47. 472 U.S. 38, 91 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
48. For a recent historical analysis of the Establishment Clause in accord with
Rehnquist's view, see Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights As Constitution, 100 YAlE L.J
1131, 1157-61 (1991).
49. 486 U.S 888 (1988). Justice Scalia said:
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though he was, I suspect that these departures would have seemed too
revolutionary to Justice Harlan. Embracing this sort of drastic shift in
analysis would have been too much for a man with his characteristic
skepticism of rapid change in the law. Here again, I call to mind his
opinion in51 Maryland v. Wirtz and its stark contrast to National League
of Cities.
A second aspect of the Justice's conservatism was his nice sense of
civil liberties. His opinions in Cohen v. California,5 2 Roth v. United
States, 53 Ginzburg v. United States,' 4 NAACP v. Alabama,5 5 and
United States v. O'Brien56 show that he was willing not only to accept
established precedent but also to embrace and extend it. These may be
cautious, but they are not grudging statements on his part. So too his
concurrence in Garnerv. Louisiana,57 where he expressed his conviction
that a black man sitting in protest at a "whites only" lunch counter was
engaged in a form of expression protected under the First Amendment, a
finding described by one contemporary commentator as a "venture rich in
imaginative daring. "s And certainly his dissent in Poe v. Ullman
demonstrates a visceral commitment to the liberty of the individual against

I would therefore abandon the "balancing" approach to these negative Commerce
Clause cases, first explicitly adopted 18 years ago in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,
and leave essentially legislative judgments to the Congress. Issues already
decided I would leave untouched, but would adopt for the future an analysis
more appropriate to our role and our abilities ....
In my view a state statute is
invalid under the Commerce Clause if, and only if, it accords discriminatory
treatment to interstate commerce in a respect not required to achieve a lawful
state purpose.
Id. at 897-98 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S.
69, 95-96 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) (concluding that an Indiana law regulating
corporate acquisitions was not invalid under the dormant Commerce Clause: "As long as
a State's corporation law governs only its own corporations and does not discriminate
against out-of-state interests, it should survive this Court's scrutiny under the Commerce
Clause ....
Beyond that, it is for Congress to prescribe its invalidity.").
50. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
51. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
52. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
53. 354 U.S. 476, 496 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
54. 383 U.S. 463, 493 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
55. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); NAACP v. Alabama
ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288 (1964).
56. 391 U.S. 367, 388 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring).
57. 368 U.S. 157, 185 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring).
58. HARRY KALvEN, JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 132 (1966).
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what he called "purposeless restraints."" Others in the course of this
symposium will explore in considerable detail some of the substantive
areas these cases touch upon. What I am trying to do is get a sense of the
conservatism of the man, and what it meant.
Set against these decisions are some harsh and, I would say, not
particularly attractive opinions. For example, Flemming v. Nestor,€'
which justified the denial of social security benefits to a person who had
been deported as a result of a brief and distant period of membership in
the Communist Party, was a rather unedifying exercise in strained
rationalization of a clearly punitive and unfair exercise of legislative
power. The Justice also worked too hard to sustain a conviction under the
Smith Act in Scales v. United States,6 although he did agree to overturn
the conviction of a much less sympathetic defendant in Noto v. United
States. 2 His opinion for the Court in the Anastaplo' case, involving
admission to the bar of a man who obviously had no sympathy for
communism but who refused on principle to answer questions regarding
membership--specifically eschewing reliance on the privilege against selfincrimination-seemed both harsh and grudging in accepting the Court's
earlier decision in Konigsberg v. State Bar of California,I from which
he had dissented.' Since he proclaimed that balancing, not some sharp
doctrinal declension, was the touchstone in such cases, it would seem that
he was too timid, perhaps too reluctant to break with Justice Frankfurter
or perhaps too unwilling to sign on to a crusade led by Justice Douglas
against the McCarthy era's badgering of marginal and quirky individuals,
to allow his common sense and well-developed sense of decency to carry
through to a conclusion.
Nevertheless, even these more or less regrettable decisions dealing
with the perceived domestic threat of communist ideology in the 1950s
reflect a critical aspect of the Justice's conservative judicial
philosophy-his willingness to give broad scope to the legislative process
as a vehicle to correct the nation's ills. The Justice was anything but
ignorant of the nation's obsessive fear of all things foreign. His own
confirmation to the Court had been temporarily blocked by accusations
that he was a "world federalist" and an "internationalist. "I He quite

59. 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
60. 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

367 U.S. 203 (1961).
367 U.S. 290 (1961).
In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961).
353 U.S. 252 (1957).
See id. at 276 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
This opposition stemmed in large part from his inactive membership in the Council
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likely disagreed with the anti-communism pronouncements of Congress
and the state legislatures, but he refused to solve the problem by holding
these statutes unconstitutional. These decisions are thus consistent with
many others in which the Justice expressed his faith in the ability of the
legislative process to correct the country's problems, and with his beliefs
about the role of the federal courts and their proper relationship to the
other federal and state branches of government. This attitude is perhaps
best captured in a speech the Justice gave in 1963, in which he stated that
[there are those who] doubt whether the federal system is any
longer adequate to meet the needs of modem American society;
[who are] impatien[t] with the slowness of political solutions
generally; and [who] urge . . . quick and uncompromising
panaceas for things that call for reform. I venture to say at the
outset that this cosmic view of the place of the judiciary is not
only inconsistent with the principles of American democratic
society but ultimately threatens the integrity of the judicial system
itself. 67
This quotation captures two of the previously identified aspects of the
Justice's conservatism-his respect for the legislature and his refusal to
view the Supreme Court as a legitimate engine of political reform-aspects
which merge with the Justice's respect for civil liberties in the anticommunism cases.
The final and most telling elements of Justice Harlan's conservatism
that I will discuss, the ones that best reveal his temperament, allow us to
get a picture of him as a judge, and finally best define for me why he
deserves a place in the judicial pantheon. These qualities are revealed in
his dissenting opinions in such cases as Mapp v. Ohio,6 Miranda v.

of the Atlantic Union Committee, a group that included many eminent citizens of varying
backgrounds and political stripes, and which speculated about the possibility of closer union
with other NATO countries. The reaction of some members of the Senate to this innocuous
group, which included individuals such as Gardner Cowles, Colgate Darden, Oveta Culp
Hobby, Clare Boothe Luce, and Telford Taylor, was little short of incredible. Senator
Eastland declared that "world government is really the issue in this case," 101 CONG. REC.
3013 (1955), and a large part of the future Justice's confirmation hearings in February 1955
was taken up by charges of internationalism. John Harlan weathered these inquiries
successfully. His nomination was confirmed by a vote of 71-11 in the Senate, and he took
his seat on the Court on March 28, 1955. For a fuller account of the episode, and of the
Justice's personal history in general, see Shapiro, supra note 34.
67. John M. Harlan, Thoughts at a Dedication: Keeping the Judicial Function in
Balance, 49 A.B.A. J. 943, 943 (1963).
68. 367 U.S. 643, 672 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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Arizona,' 9 Baker v. Carr7' Reynolds v. Sims,7 Shapiro v.
Thompson,7 Levy v. Louisiana,' Fay v. Noia,74 Henry v.
Mississippi,75 O'Callahan v. Parker,76 and Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co.' 7 There is a special quality about these dissents that provides a
window into his mind, that shows what really got under his skin. In these
cases he seemed to rise up in wrath at what the majority of the Court was
doing. In these dissents he defined his conservatism by such characteristics
as an arduous dedication to analyzing the record of the case, a refusal to
twist the historical truth to reach a desired result, a respect for adjacent
institutions, and a vision of a judicial opinion as a ruling tailored to
address the specific legal issues presented to the Court in a given case.
Let me begin with a rather obscure example-his dissent in
O'Callahan v. Parker.78 I choose it because it is typical, because it is
less well known, and because as an officium pietatis it was my privilege
when Solicitor General to argue successfully in Solorio v. United States79
for an overturn of this precedent, which had so offended the Justice.
O'Callahan was a case of an active-duty soldier who, while on leave,
entered a hotel room in Honolulu and raped and killed a guest there. Since
he was on active duty, the military elected to try him by court martial,
which proceeding, of course, did not have the same array of procedures
available as in civil courts-there was, for instance, no jury.' Twelve
years before, in Reid v. Covert,8 Justice Harlan had reversed a position
he had taken the year before and agreed that a civilian defendant
accompanying her husband to a military post overseas could not be tried
by court martial in a capital case.' It was this precedent that the Court
extended in 1969 in O'Callahanto hold that courts martial had jurisdiction

69. 384 U.S. 436, 504 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
70. 369 U.S. 186, 330 (1962) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
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394
391
372
379
395
392
395
483
See

U.S. 533, 589 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
U.S. 618, 655 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
U.S. 68, 171 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
U.S. 391, 448 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
U.S. 443, 457 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
U.S. 258, 274 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
U.S. 409, 449 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
U.S. 258, 274 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
U.S. 435, 436 (1987), reh'g denied, 483 U.S. 1056 (1987).
O'Callah~n, 395 U.S. at 263.

81. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
82. See id. at 65 (Harlan, I., concurring).
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over active-duty military personnel only if the offense was "service

connected. "'
Justice Douglas's opinion for the Court was replete with wholly
unjustified aspersions on the quality of military justice. A sense of his tone
is reflected in his assertion that
[w]hile the Court of Military Appeals takes cognizance of some
constitutional rights of the accused who are court-martialed,
courts-martial as an institution are singularly inept in dealing with
the nice subtleties of constitutional law. . . .A civilian trial, in
other words, is held in an atmosphere conducive to the protection
of individual rights, while a military trial is marked by the ageold manifest destiny of retributive justice. 4
Justice Douglas attempted to support his opinion with pages of bogus
history purporting to find support for the newly minted "service
connected" concept in precedent going back to colonial and revolutionary
military practice.'
It was this combination of dismissive disdain for the military-an
attitude that played well in certain circles at that time-with a high-handed
casualness about historical truth that evidently enraged Justice Harlan and
provoked a lengthy, scholarly, and devastating rebuttal."
This episode might establish Justice Harlan's judicial temperament by
contradiction. Everything Justice Douglas was, he was not. Justice
Douglas, certainly one of the most brilliant men ever to sit on the high
Court, was contemptuous of established authority. For instance, his highhanded willingness to rule for the taxpayer in seemingly every case, no
matter what the law or logic, was legendary.' He was the darling of that
segment of society-better represented in legal academia and the press
than in the rest of the country-that in 1948 made up what Harry Truman
called Henry Wallace's American Crackpot Association. He was
notoriously neglectful of his work and contemptuous of the need to justify
or document his conclusions. It was against such an approach to the law
and to the work of the Supreme Court that Justice Harlan defined himself,
83.
84.
85.
86.

O'Callahan, 395 U.S. at 272-73.
Id. at 265-66.
See id. at 268-72.
See id. at 276-77, 280-81 (Harlan, J., dissenting).

87. See generally BERNARD WoLFMAN Er AL., DISSENTING WITHOUT OPINION: THE
BEHAVIOR OF JUSTICE WILUIAM 0. DOUGLAS IN FEDERAL TAX CASES (2d ed. 1975)
(charting Douglas's approach to tax cases from 1939 through 19-73 and tracing his shift
from favoring the government in early cases toward a clearly pro-taxpayer stance in his
later years).
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earning a reputation among his colleagues as a tireless worker who strove
to craft scholarly, well-documented, and well-reasoned analyses of the
particular legal questions that each case presented to the Court.
The same high dudgeon reappears in response to the work of a Justice
for whom he felt the greatest affection, but whose argumentation left him
shaking his head in almost admiring consternation. Justice Brennan's tour
de force in Fay v. Noia5 purported to show that the Court's new rule
allowing the retrial in federal district court of federal constitutional claims
virtually as a matter of right really had been lurking all along just under
the surface of the Supreme Court's habeas corpus jurisprudence. This
manipulation of precedent and history provoked one of Justice Harlan's
most elaborate and inexorable jobs of logical demolition. 9 And the
Justice protested again in the next term when Justice Brennan, in Henry
v. Mississippi,9° created a new rule for excusing procedural default in
state courts, thus p~rmitting not habeas corpus but direct Supreme Court
review of state court judgments that by prior principles would have been
foreclosed as resting on independent and adequate state grounds. The
Justice found particularly galling the claim in Henry that this result was
proclaimed in order to diminish the level of conflict between federal and
state courts that the Fay decision was said-to have caused."' In both of
these cases he revealed his distress at what he believed to be the twisting
of clear precedent and history in order to achieve a desired result.
The coup de main in which an aphorism substituted for argumentation
was a specialty of Chief Justice Warren, and his one-person, one-vote
holding in Reynolds v. Sims' drew one of the most eloquent examples
of Justice Harlan's wrath. 3 In this case and in Wesberry v. Sanders,'
the Justice's earlier predictions in Baker v. Carr9 about where the

88. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
89. See id. at 448 (Harlan, J., dissenting).

90. 379 U.S. 443 (1964).
91. See id. at 463-65 (Harlan, J., dissenting).

92. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
93. See id. at 615 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan wrote that, as a result of
the Court's decision,
in all but a handful of States which may already satisfy the new requirements,
the [courts] are given blanket authority and the constitutional duty to supervise
apportionment of the State Legislatures. It is difficult to imagine a more
intolerable and inappropriate interference by the judiciary with the independent
legislatures of the States. No standards can guide a court [in this task].
Id. at 621.
94. 376 U.S. 1, 20 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
95. 369 U.S. 186, 330 (1962) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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Court's excursions must take it proved, in spite of unconvincing
assurances at the time, to be entirely correct. It was this same quality of
aphoristic diktat that so provoked the Justice about the Miranda case. No
doubt, as shown by his dissent in Culombe v. Connecticut, 6 in which he
would have upheld a conviction resting on a confession given by an
illiterate retarded man after five days of questioning, Justice Harlan was
willing to allow great scope-perhaps too much-to police interrogation.
But that was not the basis of his dudgeon. What he inveighed against was
the nakedly legislative character of the Court's opinion, which did not
even pretend to address the case before it but rather took it as the occasion
to lay down an elaborate code of police procedure.
Miranda was perhaps the most unabashed example to date of the
Court's imposition of its general policy views on a whole area, without
regard to what the case before it required for decision. In this respect it
was the forerunner of the Court's constitutional code for abortion cases set
out in Roe v. Wade.' Justice Harlan attacked the Miranda holding
largely because it violated his convictions of what an exercise of judicial
power should be: the application of a particular rule that would control the
disposition of a particular case. ,
Another example of these dissents that provide a window into Justice
Harlan's mind is his opinion in Levy v. Louisiana.' This dissent again
shows his commitment to rigorous examination of the legal issues
presented by a case, and his refusal to engage in what he scornfully
referred to in another context as "the substitution of words for
analysis. ""'°
In his opinion for the Court in Levy, Justice Douglas invalidated as a
denial of equal protection a provision of a state law that precluded
unacknowledged illegitimate children from bringing wrongful death
actions. 10 ' This case was perhaps a precursor to both the expanded use
of the Equal Protection Clause and the Court's wholesale
constitutionalization of the law of sexual morality and family
relationships. 1"2 Thus, Levy may have been something more than a
sentimental imposition of the politically correct intuitions that Justice

96. 367 U.S. 568, 642 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
97. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
98. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 518-19 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
99. 391 U.S. 68, 76 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
100. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J.,-dissenting).
101. See Levy, 391 U.S. at 72.
102. The accelerated use of the Equal Protection Clause in this way reappeared the
following year when, in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), Justice Brennan
invalidated state residency requirements based on class.
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Douglas never hesitated to write into the law if he could get four other
Justices to join him-as in those days he often could.
Justice Harlan dissented from the opinion of Justice Douglas, who had
started from the unexceptional premise that "even" a bastard is a person
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, then immediately
jumped to the conclusion that the Louisiana scheme was invidious. 1°
The reasoning accompanying that traverse was as follows: "A law which
creates an open season on illegitimates in the area of automobile accidents
gives a windfall to tortfeasors. But it hardly has a causal connection with
the 'sin' which
104 is, we are told, the historic reason for the creation of the

disability."

Justice Harlan's dissent was n6t written with a lack of concern for the
bigotry sometimes shown toward illegitimates. He had no more sympathy
for such prejudice than did Douglas, as is illustrated by his earlier opinion
in De Sylva v. Ballentine, °5 defining the rights of illegitimate children
under the Copyright Act. But he could not abide the casual, aphoristic,
and high-handed moral superiority of Justice Douglas's opinion, an
opinion which simply ignored the legal issues of the case before the Court.
The elegance and inexorability of Harlan's puncturing of the Court's
reasoning, if that is what it was, bears some quotation:
Louisiana has chosen, as have most other States in one
respect or another, to define these classes of proper plaintiffs in
terms of their legal rather than their biological relation to the
deceased. A man may recover for the death of his wife, whether
he loved her or not, but may not recover for the death of his
paramour. A child may recover for the death of his adopted
parents. An illegitimate may recover for the wrongful death of a
parent who has taken a few hours to acknowledge him formally,
but not for the death of a person who he claims is his parent but
who has not acknowledged him....
The Court today, for some reason which I am at a loss to
understand, rules that the State must base its arbitrary definition
of the plaintiff class on biological rather than legal relationships.
Exactly how this makes the Louisiana scheme even marginally
more "rational" is not clear, for neither a biological relationship
nor legal acknowledgement is indicative of the love or economic
dependence that may exist between two persons. It is, frankly,
103. See Levy, 391 U.S. at 70.
104. Glonav. American Guar. &Liab. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 75 (1968) (companion case
to Levy, invalidating the Louisiana wrongful death statute that barred recovery of damages
to the parent of an illegitimate child).
105. 351 U.S. 570 (1956).
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preposterous to suggest that the State has made illegitimates into
"nonpersons," or that, by analogy... it might deny illegitimates
constitutional
rights or the benefits of doing business in corporate
106
form.
It is this sort of rigorous analysis that characterizes Justice Harlan's
conservatism, an analysis that formed the foundation of his unshakable
conviction about the importance of intellectual honesty in his opinions.
One can only possess this sort of conviction when one has worked over
the record of a case, the precedents cited to the Court, and the arguments
presented by counsel.
I will mention only two other dissents that characterize Justice
Harlan's conservative approach, and that reflect several of the Justice's
foundational convictions. In Afroyim v. Rusk,"° the Court invalidated a
provision of the Nationality Act of 194018 under which a naturalized
citizen lost his citizenship by voting in a foreign election. The Court held
that Congress was without power to strip a person of his citizenship
without his consent because of the declaration of the Fourteenth
Amendment that "[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States.
. . are citizens of the United States."' 9 Pointing to the palpable
historical fact that the purpose of the Citizenship Clause was to overturn
one of the effects of the Dred Scottu" decision, Justice Harlan's dissent
concluded that "[t]he construction now placed on the Citizenship Clause
rests, in the last analysis, simply on the Court's ipse dixit, evincing little
more, it is quite apparent, than the present majority's own distaste for the
expatriation power.""'
The Justice's dissent in this case worked on two levels. First, he
realized that the public policy behind the Court's decision was dubious in
the extreme, no less than the one in Shapiro v. Thompson," where the
denial of a one-year residency requirement for welfare applicants gave
impetus to a race to the bottom in respect to state-provided benefits. Ours
is a nation of immigrants and, unlike those nations where naturalization
is rare and difficult, in our history it is a voluntary act of allegiance. For
that reason why should Congress not be allowed to assure that citizenship
depends on eschewing acts that clearly assert membership in other national

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Levy, 391 U.S. at 79 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
387 U.S. 253 (1967).
Ch. 876, § 401, 54 Stat. 1168 (repealed 1952).
Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 261-62 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1).
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
111. Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 293 (Harlan, I., dissenting).
112. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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communities? To be sure, the Vietnam era, with its emigrations to avoid
the draft, was upon us and the xenophobia of the McCarthy era had only
just faded. But these are factors more appropriate to the changing
responses of a legislature than to a Court supposedly expounding
principles of the Constitution. It was thus at this second level that the
Justice's dissent also worked, fundamentally rejecting the premise that
such issues should be decided by the Court under the guise of
constitutional interpretation and, worse yet, addressed through a torturing
of the history of a constitutional amendment.
One final example. In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. , 3 the Court,
overturning a century of precedent, reinterpreted the Reconstruction Civil
Rights Actn 4 -which evidently had been intended to remove disabilities
imposed by the states on the legal capacity of former slaves to contract
and own property-as prohibiting discriminatory refusals by private
parties to enter into such relations. Justice Stewart's opinion for the Court
was a tour de force of what one might call post-modernism in statutory
construction. He skillfully blended a creative use of the historic record
with argumentation designed to show that private refusals are after all as
much underwritten by the legal system as are legal disabilities. In other
words, this decision was a precursor of the Critical Legal Studies
movement campaign against the validity of the public/private
distinction."' This project, however, is particularly dubious when
applied to elucidate the meaning of a statute that issued from a world view
in which the distinction was second-nature. Justice Harlan-sensitive to
the delicate state of civil rights at the time and of the pendency before
Congress of fair housing legislation that would have accomplished
explicitly what the Court was now enacting in the name of historical
truth-did no more than suggest that any decision by the Court at that
time was inopportune, while at the same time completely demolishing the
sophistic edifice that the Court had constructed to justify its demarche , 6
Is it naive and somehow contrary to the newly permanent tenets of
post-modernism in constitutional adjudication to refer to such virtues of
candor and scrupulousness? The point certainly is not that the truths of the
Constitution are somehow permanent and unchanging. Justice Harlan was
neither a natural lawyer nor one who sought to pin down the law once and
for all by reference to the historic methods of originalism. The Justice

113. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
114. Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1988).
115. See MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987); A
Symposium of CriticalLegal Studies, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 929 (1985); Critical Legal Studies
Symposium, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984); Roberto Unger, The Critical Legal Studies
Movement, 96 HARv. L. REv. 561 (1983).
116. See Jones, 392 U.S. at 449-50, 473 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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believed, as did his intellectual mentor, Felix Frankfurter, in evolving
standards of constitutional law. And where the Court was willing to
acknowledge competing considerations openly and balance them candidly,
he was quite ready to incorporate that balance into his view of the
Constitution. But this method works only when it is deployed with care,
candor, respect, and modesty. It must respect precedent, and it must
respect the competence and validity of the other decision-making centers
in our political process.
The common thread that runs through all of the above-cited dissents,
that is, what offended the Justice most in all of these cases, was not their
"liberal" bias-he was often capable of displaying such a bias
himself-but their high-handedness, their lack of candor, their disdain for
the attitudes, traditions, precedents, and sensibilities of persons and
'institutions with which the Court disagreed. In the end, Justice Harlan did
not think that Supreme Court adjudication could be disciplined by fixed
principles or methodologies, but only by what goes under the oldfashioned name of craftsmanship.117 I repeat: candor, care, being true
to the facts, the record, and the precedents, and a modest respect for the
other institutions that surround the Supreme Court-these are the
hallmarks of Mr. Justice Harlan's conservative ethic and the characteristics
that have led many to invoke his name as a role model.
Of all the Rip Van Winkle exercises that occupy those idle moments
I devote to the law, none fascinates me more than to ponder what Justice
Harlan would do today, or would have done in the past decade of
reconstitution. How would he have voted in Bakke?" 8 How in
Weber. 9 Would he have agreed that Justice Brennan's way with Title
VII was, in the words of the Justice who succeeded to Harlan's seat,
"reminiscent not of jurists such as Hale, Holmes, and Hughes, but of
escape artists such as Houdini"? 1 ° Perhaps he would have signed on to
Justice Rehnquist's demolition job on the Court's reasoning that was in
substance worthy of Justice Harlan, though the style was all Rehnquist.
But perhaps he might have seen some point in allowing greater latitude to
private exercises of affirmative action than to those that proceed under
state compulsion or are engaged in by government. Although it is
likely-but not certain-that Justice Harlan would have dissented in Roe

117. To quote once again from Burke: "Circumstances (which with some gentlemen
pass for nothing) give in reality to every political principle its distinguishing color and
diserminating effect." BURKE, supra note 14, at 7.
118. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
119. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
120. Id. at 222 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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v. Wade,"' how would he vote today? 1" And how would he have
13
reacted to the Court's recent announcement in Arizona v. Fulminante

that the harmless error doctrine might apply in cases of coerced
confessions 1 -- a decision that might be thought to go beyond a
repudiation of Miranda and beyond Stone v. Powell"

and Justice

O'Connor's intimations that in post-conviction proceedings the issue of
guilt or innocence should be of primary conern."

Finally, is Justice O'Connor perhaps the present avatar of his spirit?
Though neither she nor Justice Powell have or had quite the same tone and
style that characterized the Justice's opinions, their care, their modesty,
their respect for precedent and adjacent institutions, and their occasional
willingness to put their foot down in the face of truly abominable behavior
remind me of the particular kind of conservatism that characterized Justice

Harlan. It was these characteristics that marked Justice Harlan's
contributions to the Supreme Court, and these traits which mark his
contribution to the legal tradition for which he had so much respect.

121. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The argumentation of Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman,
367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (Harlan, I., dissenting), as well as his refusal to condemn laws
proscribing adultery, fornication, and homosexuality leave little doubt that he would have
held with the dissenters in Roe.
122. Predictions about how Justice Harlan would have voted in any present case are
extremely difficult. Not only did the Justice believe that the content of constitutional
provisions evolved over time, he also showed an open willingness to reevaluate his views.
Several times during his last year on the Court, for example, he admitted that he had
changed his mind on a particular matter, stating that it is "more important to re-think past
conclusions than to adhere to them without question." Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,
403 U.S. 29, 72 n.3 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
123. 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991).
124. In Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), Harlan's dissenting opinion
specifically excludes coerced confessions from his harmless error analysis. See id. at 52 n.7
(Harlan, J., dissefiting).
125. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
126. See Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 211 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(stating that Miranda violations should not be cognizable in federal habeas corpus
proceedings); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 313 (1989) (stating that "our cases have
moved in the direction of reaffirming the relevance of the likely accuracy of convictions
in determining the available scope of habeas review").

